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Objective: To document how changes in
household wealth following the dissolution
of marriage and cohabitation differ by gender
in Germany.
Background: Marital property regimes usually
prescribe that both partners receive a share of
the couple’s wealth following a divorce. The dis-
solution of cohabiting unions is not governed
by marital property regimes in most countries,
including Germany. Because men, on average,
legally own a larger share of couple wealth than
women, gender differences in household wealth
might be more pronounced following the disso-
lution of cohabitation as compared to marriage.
Method: The analysis consists of individual
fixed effects regression models using longitudi-
nal data from the German socio-economic panel
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(N = 18,131 individuals) for the years 2002 to
2017.
Results: The dissolution of marriage is nega-
tively related to the accumulation of wealth over
time and effect sizes are similar for men and
women. The dissolution of cohabiting unions is
related to losses in wealth for women but not for
men. Models accounting for various postdisso-
lution factors suggest that an unequal division
of household wealth produces these gender dif-
ferences after the dissolution of cohabitation.
Conclusion: Whereas the dissolution of mar-
riage lowers household wealth for men and
women alike, there are gender differences in
how the dissolution of cohabiting unions affects
the accumulation of wealth. Union dissolution
therefore has the potential to contribute to gen-
der inequality in household wealth.
How consequential is union dissolution for an
individual’s economic resources? A large body
of literature has documented how household
income drops after union dissolution (Andreß,
Borgloh, Bröckel, Giesselmann, & Hum-
melsheim, 2006; McManus & DiPrete, 2001;
Smock, 1994; Uunk, 2004; Van Damme,
Kalmijn, & Uunk, 2008). Because these eco-
nomic losses are greater for women (Andreß
et al., 2006; DiPrete & McManus, 2000; Van
Damme et al., 2008), union dissolution is
a factor that contributes to gender inequal-
ity in household income. What is missing
from this relatively large body of literature
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on the economic consequences of union
dissolution is what happens with men’s and
women’s household wealth after separation or
divorce (exceptions are Addo & Lichter, 2013;
Painter, Frech, & Williams, 2015; Wilmoth &
Koso, 2002; Zagorsky, 2005).
It is important to include wealth in the study
of the economic consequences of union dissolu-
tion for several reasons. First, union dissolution
is a potential driver behind wealth inequality
between individuals (Zagorsky, 2005). Sec-
ond, accumulated wealth can be employed to
cushion the impact of separation on a per-
son’s standard of living (Killewald, Pfeffer, &
Schachner, 2017). How well men and women
are able to deal with a union dissolution depends
on initial levels of household wealth, how
wealth is split between partners, and differences
in individual wealth accumulation following a
breakup. Even though income differences pre-
dominantly favor men following divorce, most
wealth is split equally among divorcing part-
ners (depending on the legal context). In some
legal contexts, women can claim larger parts of
household wealth due to their higher financial
need following dissolution (Smith, 2002). If this
is the case, wealth can turn out to be an impor-
tant resource cushioning gender differences in
the overall economic consequences of union
dissolution.
At the same time, there are several reasons
to believe that wealth trajectories of ex-partners
might diverge following union dissolution.
First of all, the division of wealth following a
divorce will be influenced by the marital prop-
erty regime of the context studied. In Germany,
the country-case of our study, the default prop-
erty regime stipulates equal sharing of wealth
accrued during marriage. There are important
exceptions to this default regime: Premarriage
wealth and inheritances are not shared and
the default property regime may be modified
through prenuptial agreements. Given that
women are likely to bring less wealth into the
marriage (Sierminska, Frick, & Grabka, 2010)
we expect them to leave a relationship with less
wealth too.
Second, the separation of cohabiting unions
is not governed by the same rules as marriage
(Perelli-Harris & Sánchez Gassen, 2012). There
is no legal obligation to split wealth accumulated
during cohabitation in most countries, including
Germany. Because of men’s higher earnings as
compared to women’s, men are likely to generate
relatively more (financial) wealth during rela-
tionships (Lersch, 2017). After the dissolution
of a marriage, women normally have the right
to half of this accumulated wealth. However,
women have no legal basis to claim an equal
share after the end of a cohabiting union. The
division of household wealth is therefore likely
to be less gender-equal following the dissolution
of cohabiting unions than after divorces.
In short, there are important reasons to expect
that a sole focus on income can underestimate
gender inequality in the economic consequences
of union dissolution. In this study, we use lon-
gitudinal data from the German socio-economic
panel (SOEP) to document changes in household
wealth after union dissolution. The main ques-
tions we ask are: Are there gender differences in
how much household wealth changes after the
dissolution of marriage and cohabitation? Are
gender differences produced by postdissolution
processes or because of the division of wealth at
the time of union dissolution?
Our results indicate that both men and women
end up with less per capita household wealth
after the dissolution of marriage and there
are no major gender differences in how much
wealth is lost. At the same time, we find that
the dissolution of cohabiting unions is related
to wealth losses for women, but not for men.
Once accounting for postdissolution processes,
these gender differences persist. This suggests
that an unequal division of household wealth
leads to gendered wealth losses after the disso-
lution of cohabiting unions. If future research
consolidates this finding, and if cohabitation
keeps becoming more prevalent, union disso-
lution might become an increasingly important
determinant of gender differences in household
wealth.
Background
Gender, Union Dissolution, and Wealth
A handful of studies has documented how
wealth relates to separation or divorce from
marriage in the United States, without paying
much attention to gender differences (Addo
& Lichter, 2013; Halpern-Manners, Warren,
Raymo, & Nicholson, 2015; Painter et al., 2015;
Wilmoth & Koso, 2002; Zagorsky, 2005). These
studies have generally examined levels of
household wealth depending on individuals’
partnership trajectories experienced in the past
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(with the exception of the analysis of changes
over time performed by Zagorsky, 2005). Indi-
viduals who experienced the dissolution of a
marriage have lower household wealth com-
pared to continuously partnered people (Addo &
Lichter, 2013; Painter et al., 2015; Wilmoth &
Koso, 2002; Zagorsky, 2005). Findings regard-
ing re-marriage have been mixed. Some studies
found re-marriage to dampen or eliminate the
effects of union dissolution (Painter et al., 2015;
Wilmoth & Koso, 2002), but other studies found
persisting disadvantage after re-marriage (Addo
& Lichter, 2013).
These previous studies proposed several
mechanisms that could produce wealth losses
after union dissolution. First, economies of
scale make it cheaper for two individuals to
live together instead of having to maintain two
separate households. Union dissolution implies
losses of these economies of scale and at least
one partner must find new accommodation.
The costs related to such a move are likely to
reduce the former partners’ overall stock of
wealth (Zagorsky, 2005). Second, the direct
costs of legal divorce may further reduce wealth
after marriage. Third, besides economies of
scale, there are other reasons why persons in
a union accumulate more wealth as compared
to single individuals; these include possible
tax benefits and increased incentives to save
(Lersch, 2017; Vespa & Painter, 2011). Union
dissolution will put an end to such benefits
related to being in a union. Fourth, behavior
changes following separation (Zagorsky, 2005)
and this might affect earnings, consumption,
and saving. For instance, many women who end
up with physical custody of dependent children
have to reduce their labor supply following a
breakup (Van Damme et al., 2008). Last, indi-
viduals who end a union might be selected in
terms of their economic resources as compared
to individuals who stay with their partners.
Therefore, the cross-sectional differences in
wealth observed in some of the previous studies
(Addo & Lichter, 2013; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002)
might reflect preexisting economic disadvantage
rather than a causal effect of union dissolution
on wealth. One important limitation of exist-
ing research is that no study, to our knowledge,
examined changes in wealth after the dissolution
of cohabitation.
Most of the mechanisms described above can
apply to cohabitation and marriage alike, with
the exception of legal costs related to divorce
and marriage-related tax benefits. This would
suggest relatively modest differences between
cohabitation and marriage in how much union
dissolution affects wealth. However, couples
who cohabit might differ in terms of the amount
of wealth they own as compared to married cou-
ples. If this is the case, they might have rela-
tively less to lose from union dissolution, leading
to fewer changes in household wealth following
the dissolution of cohabiting unions as compared
to divorce. Research on income has found that
women’s income losses after the dissolution of
cohabitation used to be less severe than income
losses after divorce, but these differences con-
verged over time; probably related to changing
selection into cohabitation (Tach & Eads, 2015).
Existing research has paid little attention to
the question of whether there are any gender
differences in the consequences of union disso-
lution for household wealth. Zagorsky (2005)
found women’s wealth to be affected slightly
more by divorce than men’s wealth, but
concluded that divorce “destroys wealth dra-
matically for both sexes” (p. 418). Wilmoth
and Koso (2002) did not find significant gender
differences in the effects of separation from
first marriages but found women who sepa-
rated from higher-order marriages and who
divorced (regardless of union order) to have less
wealth than men who experienced those events.
Why might we expect gender differences in
wealth losses after union dissolution? We dis-
cuss three major explanations: rules specific to
marital property regimes, wealth accumulation
within cohabitation, and gender differences in
postseparation processes.
Marital Property Regimes
Divorce marks the legal end of marriage where
the final re-distribution of wealth is settled
according to marital property regimes. We
expect that partners anticipate these legal obli-
gations and, therefore, that the consequences of
a marital dissolution already emerge with the
end of co-residence when both partners divide
their property.
The extent to which wealth is shared after
a divorce depends on the legal context stud-
ied. Which parts of wealth are divided after
divorce and what the leading principle is to
achieve an equitable distribution of assets dif-
fers across countries. In some countries, all of
the couple’s wealth is divided across partners.
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In some countries, couple wealth is divided into
two equal parts (e.g., the Nordic countries and
some states in the United States; Voena, 2015),
whereas in other contexts “need” is the lead-
ing principle to determine the share of wealth
assigned to each partner and judges have great
discretion in dividing assets (e.g., in England
and Wales; Smith, 2002). Because needs vary
across individuals and are in general higher for
women (related to the co-residence of children),
“needs-based” systems might end up giving rel-
atively more wealth to women as compared to
other systems.
In Germany, the country of our study,
only wealth accumulated during the mar-
riage is divided between partners after divorce
(Smith, 2002). This implies that individuals
who bring less wealth into the relationship than
their partners will also lose more in terms of
household wealth following divorce. Previous
research on Germany has shown that men
bring more wealth to marriages (Kapelle &
Lersch, 2020; Sierminska et al., 2010). Because
men are on average older at union formation and
have higher earnings, they are likely to have had
more possibilities to accumulate wealth before
union formation than their female partners.
Hence, men’s household wealth might drop less
pronouncedly following divorce than women’s
household wealth in Germany. This would differ
from previous findings on the US context that
gender differences in wealth losses after divorce
are relatively minor (Zagorsky, 2005).
A deviation from an equal division of wealth
can also arise when prenuptial agreements mod-
ify the applicable marital regime. Rising divorce
rates might make couples more wary of entering
into a union that can lead to pronounced wealth
losses in the case of divorce. Therefore, prenup-
tial agreements might have become more rel-
evant (Rainer, 2007) and might have increased
inequality in the division of wealth following
divorces. For France, evidence indeed showed
that married couples increasingly sign prenuptial
agreements and separate their wealth (Frémeaux
& Leturcq, 2018). For Germany, these trends
have not yet been examined.
Wealth Accumulation within Cohabitation
The division of wealth might be less equal after
the dissolution of cohabiting unions because
laws equalizing the distribution of household
wealth after divorce are not applied for cohabita-
tion. Cohabiting couples normally do not have to
inform authorities about the dissolution of their
union, and if so, procedures are relatively simple
(Perelli-Harris & Sánchez Gassen, 2012). Some
countries mention cohabiting unions in their
laws, but the dissolution of cohabiting relation-
ships remains largely unregulated, with the par-
tial exceptions of Sweden, Norway, and regis-
tered partnerships in France and the Netherlands.
In Germany, marital property law does not gov-
ern the dissolution of cohabiting unions. The law
does prescribe alimony payments if the couple
recently had a child (Perelli-Harris & Sánchez
Gassen, 2012, p. 448) and there are some (very
limited) possibilities to claim economic com-
pensation from former partners outside of mar-
ital property law (Sanders, 2013). Since 2008,
individuals can, in principle, claim compensa-
tion if they made individual contributions to “the
couple” of lasting financial value. This includes
financial contributions made to assets, such as
mortgage payments, but excludes day-to-day
expenses and efforts including domestic work
and childcare (Sanders, 2013, p. 646).
As compared to marriage, this implies that
assets accumulated during the duration of the
union should only be divided between part-
ners after the dissolution of a cohabiting union
if both partners directly contributed to acquir-
ing an asset. Hence, if women contribute less
to the accumulation of wealth within relation-
ships, this will lead to gender differences in how
much household wealth changes after the disso-
lution of cohabiting unions. Previous research
has shown that men indeed accumulate more
wealth than women within relationships. By
far the most important determinants of indi-
vidual wealth accumulation within couples are
labor market experience and earnings (Sier-
minska et al., 2010), suggesting that the higher
earnings potential of men translates into an
unequal accumulation of wealth within relation-
ships (Lersch, 2017).
Gender differences in how wealth changes
after dissolution might be even more pronounced
because cohabiting couples are more likely to
keep their finances separate (Hiekel, Liefbroer,
& Poortman, 2014) and are therefore less likely
to accumulate joint wealth. In a study of indi-
vidual wealth ownership within marriages and
cohabiting unions in Germany, Grabka, Marcus,
and Sierminska (2015) found that women owned
on average 37% of couple wealth in 2007. But,
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the gender gap in wealth within relationships did
not differ significantly or substantively depend-
ing on marital status. Similarly, Kapelle and Ler-
sch (2020) showed that the gender gap in wealth
within couples changes little once couples tran-
sition from cohabitation to marriage.
Postdissolution Processes
In most empirical settings, wealth is measured
at a given point in time before and after the
event (e.g., Zagorsky, 2005). Therefore, esti-
mates both reflect how wealth is divided between
partners at the time of union dissolution as well
as processes that affect individual wealth accu-
mulation after dissolution. Two such processes
appear important to highlight: variation in earn-
ings, consumption, and savings on the one hand,
and re-partnering on the other hand.
Previous studies found greater economic
consequences of union dissolution for women in
terms of household income (Andreß et al., 2006;
McManus & DiPrete, 2001; Smock, 1994;
Uunk, 2004; Van Damme et al., 2008). This
is partly due to the higher chances of living
with children and the resulting care obligations
that hinder labor market participation. In addi-
tion, mothers living with children have greater
economic needs as compared to their partners.
This will result in lower savings for women
and in gender differences in wealth trajectories
following union dissolution disadvantaging
women.
Studies on divorce have generally found
re-partnering to offset part of the negative
effects of union dissolution on women’s wealth,
but even after remarriage, their wealth remains
lower compared to the continuously married
(Painter et al., 2015; Wilmoth & Koso, 2002).
At the same time, given that men in general
re-partner more often and faster than women
(Di Nallo, 2019), re-partnering might actually
increase the average gap in wealth between men
and women following union dissolution.
This Study: Union Dissolution and Wealth
in Germany
In this article, we study union dissolution in
21st century Germany. We follow individuals
across time in order to estimate changes in
per capita household wealth after union dis-
solution. Following earlier studies on gender
differences in the consequences of union disso-
lution, we are interested in how women’s and
men’s standard of living changes after a breakup
(McManus & DiPrete, 2001; Smock, 1994;
Tach & Eads, 2015). Main results are presented
in terms of changes in per capita household
wealth across waves. This raises the question
to what extent household wealth accurately
captures an individuals’ standard of living.
Households’ economic resources are not always
shared equally between partners, with men
often having a greater command over economic
resources than women (Cantillon, 2013; Lauer
& Yodanis, 2011). Therefore, standards of living
can vary within households and studies suggest
that individuals in cohabiting unions are less
likely to share economic resources than persons
in a marriage (Bennett, 2013). Therefore, we
also examine individual measures of wealth
(i.e., based on the legal ownership of wealth;
see Grabka et al., 2015) in an additional set of
analyses.
Previous studies found relatively minor
gender differences in household wealth follow-
ing divorce in the United States (Wilmoth &
Koso, 2002; Zagorsky, 2005). We expect to find
clearer gender differences in our study for two
reasons: (a) in Germany, premarriage wealth is
not divided after divorce, whereas this is the
case in some states of the United States; (b) we
include cohabiting unions where no division of
wealth is required after dissolution.
Besides estimating gender differences in the
overall change in per capita household wealth
after the dissolution of cohabitation and mar-
riage, the second major goal of this article is to
understand whether these differences arise due
to postdissolution processes or because wealth
is split unevenly at the time of dissolution.
We expect an unequal division of wealth after
the dissolution of cohabitation in particular.
Differences between cohabitation and marriage
have not been studied longitudinally in previous
research. Because the division of wealth is not
regulated in most countries (Perelli-Harris &
Sánchez Gassen, 2012) studying gender differ-
ences in how wealth is split after cohabitation in
Germany will be relevant for other contexts too.
Data and Method
Data
We use longitudinal data from the SOEP (ver-
sion 34; https://doi.org/10.5684/soep.v34; all
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Stata code used for data management and analy-
sis is available at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF
.IO/GTKH7) covering the period 2002–2017,
excluding extension samples without wealth
measurement (Goebel et al., 2019). The SOEP
is a household panel survey interviewing a
representative sample of the German pop-
ulation on an annual basis. Information on
wealth has been collected by the SOEP every
5 years since 2002. In the current study, we use
information on wealth from four measurement
points (2002, 2007, 2012, 2017) and waves
in between are used to construct additional
variables.
Sample
We restrict the sample to respondents aged
18–79 (reduction from N = 89,734 to 84,649
individual-year observations), to private house-
holds (remaining N = 84,301), and to household
heads and their partners (N = 75,039). We
exclude same-sex couples (N = 74,819). We
construct two different analytical samples. One
sample consists of all respondents who were in a
co-residential relationship during any of the four
waves with information on wealth (N = 10,728),
and a second sample includes all respondents
who were married during any of the waves con-
sidered (N = 53,700). Individuals can be part of
both samples if they had both cohabited and been
married during the observation period. For each
sample, we include the first wave we observe an
individual in a union/marriage as well as all sub-
sequent waves until the end of the observation
period, regardless of additional union transi-
tions. Respondents that marry their cohabiting
partner are right-censored in the cohabitation
sample (N = 8,816). We subsequently construct
a person-year dataset with information from all
waves for which individuals provided informa-
tion on wealth in at least two waves. This allows
us to examine differences in predissolution
and postdissolution wealth. The final sample
for our analysis of cohabitation includes 4,924
individual-year observations from 1,963 indi-
viduals and for our analysis of marriage 43,349
individual-year observations from 16,068 indi-
viduals. Table 1 gives an overview of sample
sizes and the number of separation events expe-
rienced according to gender and marital status.
We draw on multiply imputed wealth data from
the SOEP team. Around 5% of the sample
contains missing information on other variables.
Table 1. Sample Sizes and Number of Events Recorded
Women Men
Cohabiting persons 1, 052 911
Number of dissolutions from cohabitation 405 326
Married persons 8, 374 7, 794
Number of dissolutions from marriage 692 472
Therefore, we additionally multiply impute 40
possible values for missing information and
use the resulting 40 imputed datasets in the
analysis.
Measurement
Wealth. The outcome of interest is total net
household wealth (all assets minus debts and
loans). Assets include real estate, financial
assets, life insurance, private pension plans,
and businesses. Debts include mortgages, loans,
and other debts. The SOEP collects wealth at
the individual level. When collecting data on
collectively owned assets and debts, all indi-
viduals are asked what share of each asset each
household member owns. Given our interest
in individuals’ standard of living, we focus
on per capita wealth, which is operationalized
as total household net wealth divided by the
number of household members aged 18 or
above. In a second step of our analysis, we
also look at individual wealth to investigate to
what extent differences in wealth losses reflect
predissolution differences in ownership of assets
(and debts). To further understand the mech-
anisms underlying wealth losses, we also run
our main models for, first, housing and finan-
cial wealth, and, second, for assets and debts
separately.
Wealth is a highly skewed variable, but given
that wealth has both positive and negative val-
ues, commonly used transformations (such as
the natural logarithm) would exclude important
information from the analysis. The two most
common ways to transform wealth are to cal-
culate a rank measure or to employ the inverse
hyperbolic sine (IHS)-transformation (Killewald
et al., 2017). In our case, the advantage of using
a rank-based measure is that it more effectively
accounts for periodic changes in the distribution
of wealth (and hence periodic changes in effect
sizes) and provides easy to interpret results.
Therefore, we use individuals’ rank in the wealth
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distribution as the dependent variable in our
main analysis. This rank is calculated for each
wave separately, jointly for men and women,
and indicates the proportion of cases having less
household wealth than the individual considered
(the rank ranges from 0 to 1). In robustness
checks, we use the IHS-transformed version of
the per capita wealth variable with a theta of
0.0001 (Friedline, Masa, & Chowa, 2015). For
this measure, wealth is adjusted for price infla-
tion (set to prices of 2015) and its distribution is
winsorized at the 0.1 and 99.9 percentiles.
Union Dissolution. We define union dissolu-
tion similarly for cohabitation and marriage: an
individuals’ partner who was observed in the
household in a given wave is not in the house-
hold anymore in the next wave with informa-
tion on wealth and the partner has not died
(cases where a partner died are right-censored).
If partners move out of the household but are
observed again in the same household in later
waves, we do not consider this couple as hav-
ing experienced a union dissolution. For indi-
viduals who experienced the dissolution of a
union, our dependent variable takes on the value
of 1 for all waves following the dissolution.
After marriage, we do not differentiate between
the end of co-residence and legal divorce, but
we examine legal divorce as the event of union
dissolution in robustness checks. Person-years
before dissolution take on the value of 0; this
is also the case for all the person-years of indi-
viduals who did not experience a dissolution
between 2002 and 2017. In additional analy-
sis, we split the union dissolution variable into
various categories based on Time since disso-
lution which captures the waves elapsed since
the partner is not observed in the same house-
hold anymore. Note that because wealth is mea-
sured once every 5 years, the first measurement
of wealth after union dissolution might occur
various years after union dissolution. Finally, we
split the separation variable into categories based
on Union duration at the time of dissolution to
investigate whether differences in the duration
of cohabiting and married unions play a role in
our results.
Additional Variables. We control for survey
year, age, and age squared in all models. We are
interested in whether wealth losses arise due to
how wealth is divided between former partners
or due to postdissolution processes. There-
fore, we also consider several variables that
capture postdissolution processes in parts of the
analysis. These variables include logged house-
hold income, the number of children below 18
in the household (categorical), self-rated health
(5-point scale with lower value indicating better
health), and dummy variables indicating being
employed, the presence of a child below the age
of 10, whether the respondent lives at the same
address as in the last wave, and whether the
respondent has a new partner.
Analytical Strategy
We start our analysis by presenting mean and
median wealth by partnership status for women
and men separately. Descriptive results are
weighted with the cross-sectional household
weights provided in the SOEP. Second, we esti-
mate individual fixed effects models to estimate
differences in wealth before and after union
dissolution:
Yit = Dit𝛾 + Xit𝛽 + 𝛼i + 𝜐it,
where Yit is per capita wealth of individual i
in year t. Dit is a time-varying indicator of
whether the individual experienced union dis-
solution after 2002 but before t. X is a vec-
tor of control variables, 𝛼iis the unobserved
time-invariant individual component, and 𝜐it is
an error term. This specific setup allows us to
estimate differences between pre- and postdis-
solution wealth for individuals who separated.
It is important to note that the goal of our
analysis is not to identify the causal effect of
dissolution on wealth. This identification is,
for instance, hampered by other time-varying
characteristics that can determine how much
wealth changes from wave to wave. Instead,
our primary goal is to descriptively examine
gender differences in how wealth changes and
is split after dissolution. For all analyses, we




Table 2 describes individuals’ average charac-
teristics for the waves they were in a union.
Averages were calculated separately by gender
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Individuals in Intact Unions (Including Predissolution Waves)
Cohabiting unions Marriage
Men Women Men Women
Median household wealth 17,746 15,324 57,371 56,719
Mean household wealth 66,934 65,879 112,916 112,664
Mean household housing wealth 27,629 26,480 61,008 62,110
Mean household financial wealth 12,243 12,087 14,719 14,779
Median individual wealth 21,618 12,009 73,853 51,577
Mean individual wealth 97,912 66,286 151,012 107,161
Mean individual housing wealth 35,213 30,726 74,306 62,761
Mean Individual Financial Wealth 17,626 12,858 19,067 12,659
Mean age 46.0 43.8 56.1 53.7
Mean logged household income 9.5 9.5 8.2 8.0
Share employed 0.73 0.69 0.58 0.43
Mean number of children below age 18 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Share with a child below age 10 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.18
Average self-rated health 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7
Union duration in years 8.7 8.3 27.5 27.3
N 1,712 1,964 20,056 21,134
and marital status. Median per capita house-
hold wealth was lower for cohabiting men and
women as compared to married individuals, pri-
marily due to differences in housing wealth.
Housing wealth was the most important com-
ponent of wealth for all groups of individuals.
Cohabiting individuals were in their mid-40s
on average, whereas married individuals were
closer to retirement age, which was also visible
in their lower levels of household income and
employment. Cohabiting unions were intact for
less time than marriages in our sample.
Figure 1 compares median household wealth
of individuals in intact unions to individuals’
median wealth after union dissolution (among
those who experienced the event). Individu-
als who experienced a union dissolution had
less household wealth than those who did not
(yet). This pattern was observed for all groups
considered but differences between the mar-
ried and formerly married were greater than
differences in wealth between the cohabiting
and the formerly cohabiting. Union dissolu-
tion was negatively associated with wealth
for men and women alike. These numbers
did not account for predissolution levels of
wealth, were not yet transformed to wealth
ranks, and were not adjusted for necessary
controls. To estimate how much household
wealth individuals lose following dissolution,
we turned to multivariable results explaining
Figure 1. Median Per Capita Wealth by Union
Status.
Note. Dissolution is separation from cohabiting union or
marriage since the first wave of observation but before the
year of measurement. No dissolution includes individuals
who never separated. Marital status indicates status when the
union dissolved. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
changes in the wealth rank among individuals
across time.
Multivariable Results
We started by estimating how much wealth
changes following union dissolution for the
mvarious groups considered. Figure 2 shows
the coefficients for having experienced a union
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Figure 2. Effect of Separation on Per Capita Wealth
Rank by Union Status and Gender.
Note. Coefficients from individual fixed effects models
indicating the difference between preseparation and postsep-
aration per capita household. Separate models ran by union
status and gender. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
dissolution from individual-level fixed effects
models explaining per capita household wealth
(estimated separately for each of the four groups
defined by gender and marital status). The figure
shows that dissolution from marriage had a
negative and statistically significant effect on
per capita household wealth for both men and
women. Individuals who separated from mar-
riage were estimated to go down 7 to 8 points
in the household wealth distribution following
union dissolution. Results differed for the
dissolution of cohabiting unions. Women expe-
rienced average drops in per capita household
wealth that were similar to those experienced by
women who left a marriage, but the effect was
slightly smaller (around 6 percentage points).
Men’s position in the household wealth dis-
tribution appeared unchanged after leaving a
cohabiting union. The effect size was close to 0,
but the confidence interval ranged from −0.06
to 0.03. The difference in wealth losses between
cohabiting men and women was statistically
significant (p = .034 in a pooled model inter-
acting gender with separation; available upon
request).
Our results therewith provide evidence that
there are gender differences in how house-
hold wealth changes after the dissolution of
cohabitation. Even though we did not find
gender differences in how wealth was split
between formerly married partners, results were
too imprecise to conclude that gender differ-
ences are smaller after divorce than after the
dissolution of cohabiting unions. Tests of dif-
ferences in how effects vary by gender after the
dissolution of cohabitation and marriage were
not statistically significant (i.e., testing whether
the interaction effect between gender and sep-
aration for the married sample is statistically
significantly different from the same inter-
action effect for the cohabiting sample gave a
p-value of .18; Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, &
Piquero, 1998).
Determinants of Gender Differences in Wealth
Changes Following Union Dissolution
The second goal of our analysis was to under-
stand to what extent our results reflect how
wealth was divided at union dissolution and
to what extent they reflect postdissolution pro-
cesses. To this end, Figure 3 presents results that
are equivalent to Figure 2 but which accounted
for observed postdissolution processes including
employment, the presence of (young) children
in the household, re-partnering, having moved
homes, log household income, and self-rated
health. Note that the inclusion of controls for
re-partnering implies that the numbers pre-
sented in Figure 3 indicate wealth losses among
those who did no re-partner. We considered
the remaining effects after controlling for these
processes to give an estimate of how wealth was
divided between partners after dissolution.
Including postdissolution factors barely
changed results for the cohabiting sample. This
suggests that gender differences in how wealth
changed after the dissolution of cohabiting
unions reflect an unequal division of household
wealth, rather than gender differences in post-
dissolution processes. For the marriage sample,
wealth losses became slightly less pronounced
for men in this specification accounting for
postdissolution processes. In contrast, women’s
losses in wealth were slightly more pronounced.
Additional analysis showed how the inclu-
sion of re-partnering as a control variable is
responsible for these small differences between
Figures 2 and 3. Re-partnering was associated
with higher household wealth for women,
but with slightly lower per capita household
wealth for men (the p-value of the interaction
effect between gender and re-partnering in a
pooled model explaining per capita wealth
for the marriage sample was .04; available
upon request).
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Figure 3. Effect of Separation on Per Capita Wealth
Rank by Union Status and Gender; Controlling for
Variables Capturing Economic Need.
Note: Coefficients from individual fixed effects models
indicating the difference between preseparation and post-
separation per capita household. Separate models ran by
union status and gender. Controlled for employment, pres-
ence of (young) children in the household, re-partnering,
having moved homes, log household income and self-rated
health. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Hence, the results suggest that gender dif-
ferences in how wealth changes following
the dissolution of cohabiting unions were not
created by postdissolution processes. The main
alternative reason is that wealth has been divided
unequally after the dissolution of cohabiting
unions. To further investigate this possibility,
we looked at changes in individual wealth rather
than per capita household wealth. Married
women might be entitled to important parts of
their partners’ individual wealth. In contrast,
formerly cohabiting women are not legally
entitled to parts of their partners’ individual
wealth, and losses in household wealth could, in
that case, reflect gender differences in individual
wealth that were already present before union
dissolution. If this holds, gender differences in
wealth losses after the dissolution of cohabi-
tation should be less pronounced in terms of
individual wealth than in terms of household
wealth.
Figure 4 shows the equivalent of Figure 3
once looking at individual-level wealth. In
the case of marriage, formerly married men
and women lost similar amounts of individual
wealth following divorce (even though losses in
individual wealth were slightly less pronounced
than losses in household wealth for formerly
married women). In the case of cohabitation,
Figure 4. Effect of Separation on Individual Wealth
Rank by Union Status and Gender; Controlling for
Variables Capturing Economic Need.
Note. Coefficients from individual fixed effects models
indicating difference between preseparation and postsepara-
tion individual wealth. Separate models ran by union status
and gender. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Con-
trolled for employment, presence of (young) children in the
household, re-partnering, having moved homes, log house-
hold income and self-rated health.
we indeed observed that losses in individ-
ual wealth were less pronounced than losses
in household wealth for formerly cohabiting
women. This indicates that formerly cohabiting
women’s losses in household wealth reflect
gender differences in individual wealth that
already existed before union dissolution. This
result was expected based on the observation
that property regimes do not cover the dissolu-
tion of cohabiting unions. If these results reflect
preexisting gender differences in individual
wealth, this also implies that some of the gender
differences in standard of living might have
been already present before union dissolution
if individual wealth was not shared between
partners (Cantillon, 2013).
As a final step to better understand our results,
we looked at changes in specific wealth compo-
nents. Differences in wealth composition might
explain why, in our sample, gender differences
in wealth losses were more pronounced after the
dissolution of cohabiting unions as compared to
marriages. Figure 5 indeed shows that formerly
married individuals primarily lost in terms of
housing wealth, whereas losses in financial
wealth were more pronounced for formerly
cohabiting individuals. Changes in financial
wealth appeared less gender-equal than changes
in housing wealth, which might indeed suggest
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Figure 5. Effect of Separation on Housing and
Financial Wealth Rank by Union Status and
Gender.
Note. Coefficients from individual fixed effects models
indicating difference between preseparation and postsepa-
ration per capita household wealth. Separate models ran
by union status and gender. Bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals.
that differences in housing wealth drove much
of our results. However, confidence intervals are
too large to come too firm conclusions in this
regard.
Robustness Checks
We ran various additional models to test the
robustness of our results. First, results were
robust to using IHS-transformed wealth instead
of wealth ranks (Appendix S1, Figure S1;
even though the effect for formerly cohabit-
ing women turned statistically insignificant),
using quantile-regression to estimate changes in
median wealth (Appendix S1, Figure S2; also
here the effect for formerly cohabiting women
turned statistically insignificant), and restricting
the analysis to legal divorces rather than disso-
lutions from marriage in general (Appendix S1,
Figure S3). Second, we adopted an alternative
strategy to estimate how wealth is split between
former partners after dissolution. Instead of
controlling for postdissolution processes, the
wealth rank of individuals was measured based
on their per capita wealth before separation and
based on individual wealth following separation
(i.e., based on legal ownership of wealth). In this
manner, postseparation household composition
changes, such as the entrance of a new partner,
have less of an impact on estimates. These
results, displayed in Appendix S1, Figure S4
and Table S1, showed how women’s wealth
losses following the dissolution of cohabitation
are greater than men’s. Gender differences in
wealth losses following dissolution from cohab-
itation were statistically significant under this
specification. There were no gender differences
in wealth losses after marriage. Third, we esti-
mated the effects of dissolution depending on
the years between the dissolution event and
the measurement of postdissolution wealth,
as displayed in Figures 6A and 6B. Due to
small sample sizes, no statistically significant
differences emerged according to the time since
dissolution. At the same time, gender differences
in wealth losses following the dissolution of
cohabitation appeared to be present regardless
of the time elapsed since union dissolution.
Similarly, we aimed to account for the fact that
dissolved unions differ in the amount of time
they lasted, which might determine the amount
of wealth accumulated during the relationship.
Gender differences were greater after cohabiting
unions of longer duration, but results were too
imprecise to come to conclusions in this regard
(Appendix S1, Figure S5).
Fourth, wealth losses might differ by age due
to the systematically different levels of wealth
during various life stages. To scrutinize this pos-
sibility, we ran additional models interacting
a categorical variable of age with separation;
results are displayed in Appendix S1, Table S2.
Not surprisingly, we found that young formerly
married individuals (aged 18–30), who had little
wealth to begin with, lost relatively little wealth
after dissolution. At the same time, we found
that, regardless of their age, formerly cohabiting
women lost wealth and formerly cohabiting men
did not.
Gender differences among formerly married
individuals (favoring men) were visible for
young individuals. This might reflect the little
time such couples will have had to jointly accu-
mulate wealth (gender differences in how wealth
changed therefore primarily reflect differences
in premarriage wealth).
Finally, we re-ran the analysis looking at
assets and debts separately. This analysis, dis-
played in Appendix S1, Figure S6, showed that
both assets and debts are reduced following
union dissolution (except for former cohabit-
ing men who do not lose either). This proba-
bly reflects a pattern where assets are sold after
union dissolution resulting in a simultaneous
reduction of assets and debt. This pattern was
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Figure 6. (A) Effect of Separation from Marriage on
Per Capita Wealth Rank Depending on Time
Between Separation and Current Wealth
Measurement, by Gender. (B) Effect of Separation
from Cohabitation on Per Capita Wealth Rank
depending on Time Between Separation and Current
Wealth Measurement, by gender.
A
B
Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Coef-
ficients from individual fixed effects models indicating dif-
ference between preseparation and postseparation wealth.
Separate models ran by union status and gender. Separation
variable is split according to the time between interview and
the wave of reference.
similar for formerly married men and women as
well as for formerly cohabiting women.
Discussion
In this study, we aimed to contribute to the lit-
erature on gender differences in the economic
consequences of union dissolution by introduc-
ing wealth into the debate. Previous studies
on the United States showed that divorce is
related to considerably lower levels of wealth
(Addo & Lichter, 2013; Painter et al., 2015),
with mixed results regarding gender differences.
No previous study examined what happens after
the dissolution of cohabiting unions. The first
aim of our analysis was to provide longitudinal
evidence on gender differences in how house-
hold wealth changes after the dissolution of mar-
riage and cohabitation in Germany.
In contrast to what has been found in earlier
research on the United States (Zagorsky, 2005),
we expected gender differences in how wealth
is divided following the dissolution of mar-
riage in Germany. This expectation was formu-
lated because of the default marital property
regime in place, which only prescribes divid-
ing wealth that is accumulated during marriage
after divorce. However, our estimates of how
wealth was divided between former partners
showed few gender differences after the disso-
lution of marriage: both men and women lost
similar amounts of wealth after the dissolution
of marriage. The limited coverage of marital
property regimes in Germany might therefore
not be as consequential as thought. One possi-
ble explanation is that most wealth was accu-
mulated during marriage, and that premarriage
wealth accounted for a relatively small share of
all household wealth divided after dissolution.
We found more support for the expectation
that there are gender differences in how wealth
changes after the dissolution of cohabiting
unions. Cohabiting men’s per capita wealth rank
differed little across predissolution and post-
dissolution observations (but standard errors
were large), whereas women lost considerably
in terms of household wealth following the
dissolution of a cohabiting union. These gender
differences were statistically significant. This
finding suggests that the dissolution of cohab-
iting unions has the potential to contribute to
gender inequality in household wealth. The
second main goal of our analysis was to explain
why gender differences in wealth changes arise
after the dissolution of cohabiting unions but
not after divorce. To this end, we investigated to
what extent results reflect the division of wealth
between partners at the time of union dissolu-
tion. Because our analysis relied on estimating
changes in wealth between survey waves, these
estimates were also influenced by postdissolu-
tion processes that affect changes in wealth such
as re-partnering, changes in employment and
differences in consumption or need. Therefore,
we accounted for postdissolution processes in
the second part of our analysis to get an estimate
of how wealth was split among former partners.
Gender differences in wealth after the dissolu-
tion of cohabiting unions persisted also once
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accounting for postdissolution processes (such
as re-partnering). This suggests that an unequal
division of wealth at the time of separation led
to gender differences in household wealth after
the dissolution of cohabiting unions.
Besides documenting gender differences, our
results also provided insight into the general
effects of union dissolution on wealth. The lack
of wealth losses observed for men after the dis-
solution of cohabitation raises the question why,
overall, the dissolution of cohabitation appears
to destroy less wealth than the dissolution of
marriage. Possible explanations include direct
legal costs related to divorce, but also differences
in predissolution levels of wealth. Given that
cohabiting couples owned less wealth than mar-
ried couples before dissolution, they had less
to lose from a separation. Union dissolution
might have driven down wealth to relatively low
levels regardless of previous union status (See
also Figure 1), which implies larger losses for
the previously married. In general, postdisso-
lution processes explained little of the wealth
losses observed, which suggests that there was
an instant cost that had to be borne after couples
split up. Such instant costs could be related to the
dissolution of a household (e.g., selling a home
under time pressure) and the establishment of
two new separate households, but future research
is required to better understand the exact mech-
anisms at play.
We would like to highlight two important
limitations of our analysis. First, a major obsta-
cle that we encountered throughout our analysis
was the imprecision of our results due to the rel-
atively small sample sizes employed. Statistical
significance of results varied across conclusions
drawn. For instance, our estimate of gender
differences in how wealth changes after the dis-
solution of cohabiting unions was statistically
significant (i.e. the interaction effect between
gender and separation). However, statistical
significance was too low to claim that these
gender differences are greater following the
dissolution of cohabiting unions as compared to
the dissolution of marriages (i.e. the difference
in interaction effects across the cohabitation and
marriage samples was not significant). Future
research is therefore needed to further cor-
roborate our findings. Unfortunately, there are
very few datasets available that fulfill the data
requirements of this type of analysis. Studies
using administrative data might be an impor-
tant step forward in answering the question of
whether wealth is divided less equally following
separation from cohabiting unions as compared
to divorce as long as they allow to identify
cohabitating unions.
Another major limitation of our study relates
to our second conclusion on the reasons why
gender differences emerge after the dissolution
of cohabiting unions. We argued that our results
reflected an unequal division of wealth at the
time of separation, but we did not directly
collect information on how wealth is split fol-
lowing union dissolution. Instead, we measured
per capita wealth at different points in time
and employed various strategies to account for
postseparation processes. Even though account-
ing for such processes led to stronger results,
directly measuring how wealth is split would be
a valuable next step that future research could
take. One way to do this would be to directly
ask respondents about the division of property
if they experienced a union dissolution.
The indirect measurement of how wealth was
split between former partners opens the door
to various explanations as to why gender dif-
ferences in wealth losses are more pronounced
following the dissolution of cohabiting unions
as compared to the ending of marriages. In our
article, we suggested that differences in laws
governing marriage and cohabiting unions lead
to a more gender unequal division of house-
hold wealth when the latter type of unions
dissolves. We found some suggestive evidence
in support of that argument by showing that
gender differences in individual wealth changes
were less pronounced than changes in house-
hold wealth for formerly cohabiting women.
An alternative explanation is that cohabiting
unions systematically differed from marriages
on characteristics that we did not observe in our
study. One possibility is that gender differences
in wealth were already present before union
formation. In other words, gender differences
in individual wealth were greater for cohabiting
couples as compared to married couples already
before the couple moved in together. If this
is the case, women would leave cohabiting
relationships with less wealth after union disso-
lution even in the hypothetical situation that the
German marital property regime would apply to
cohabiting couples. However, previous research
has shown that gender differences in individual
wealth are similar across cohabiting and married
couples, and do not change once transiting from
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cohabitation to marriage (Grabka et al., 2015;
Kapelle & Lersch, 2020).
Another possibility is that cohabiting unions
had a shorter duration than marriages that dis-
solved. Wealth accumulated before union forma-
tion will, in that case, take on a larger share of
total household wealth. If wealth brought into
a relationship is split less evenly than wealth
accumulated during the union (as prescribed
for marriages by the standard marital property
regime in Germany), this will lead to a less
equal splitting of household wealth following the
dissolution of cohabiting unions. Even though
gender differences in wealth changes increased
with the duration of cohabiting unions at the
time of dissolution (Appendix S1, Figure S5),
sample sizes were too small to discard this pos-
sibility. More in general, it has to be noted that it
is unclear whether the availability of the option
to cohabit per se makes union dissolution a less
gender equal process in terms of how wealth is
split. Even in the absence of the option of cohab-
itation, couples might opt for a prenuptional
agreement, which might lead to gender differ-
ences in wealth changes after divorce too. Future
research can further investigate whether differ-
ences in legal frameworks applying to cohabit-
ing unions and marriages are indeed responsi-
ble for gender differences in wealth losses after
union dissolution.
Nonetheless, we believe that this paper
introduces a novel and important question to
the research on the gendered economic conse-
quences of union dissolution. In a context where
marriage is the norm (and prenuptial agree-
ments rare), gender differences in household
wealth changes after dissolution might receive
little attention because most wealth is split
evenly after divorce. However, we argue that
how wealth is split following the dissolution
of cohabiting unions might amplify gender
differences in the economic consequences of
separations. If cohabitation, but not marriage, is
related to gender differences in how wealth is
split after union dissolution, and if cohabitation
is becoming ever more common compared to
marriage, union dissolution might become an
ever more influential driver of gender differ-
ences in wealth. These considerations provoke
the question of what policy measures might be
available to reduce gender differences in wealth
changes following union dissolution, as well as
the impact of union dissolution on wealth more
generally.
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